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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
88 Misc. 433, 150 N.Y.S. 738 (Sur. Ct. 1914), the facts were similar
to those in the principal case. There the judge allowed a recovery,
holding that the death should have been produced by the accused
intentionally and for the purpose of affecting the descent and dis-
tribution of the deceased's estate before a recovery is denied. This
decision was criticised in In re Sparks' Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 14
N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sur. Ct. 1939). In that case the husband killed his
wife intentionally and was found guilty of manslaughter. He relied
upon the Wolfe case, since he did not intend to affect the descent
and distribution of his wife's estate. The court found against him,
but this does not overrule the Wolf case in which there was no
intent to kill the wife.
From a consideration of these cases it would seem that the
maxim would not apply where the accused acted deliberately but
produced results which were unintentional. South Carolina has
a direct holding to this effect in the principal case; New York has a
direct holding which has been criticized; and Michigan has dicta
which supports the reasoning.
W. A. K.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-SERVICE OF PROCESS ON AUDITOR AFTER
WITHDRAWAL IN TORT CASE-CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE AFTER WITH-
DRAWAL.-Action against a foreign corporation for injury to proper-
ty resulting from flow of water and accumulation of debris allegedly
caused by D's negligence. The circuit court dismissed the action on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction, saying that service on the
auditor was void since D had been issued a withdrawal certificate
from the state one year prior to the injury. P brought error. Held,
that the statutory authority of the auditor to accept service of
process as attorney in fact for foreign corporations did not extend to
a tort case based upon a cause of action which did not arise until
after the corporation had been properly issued a withdrawal cer-
tificate from the state. Affirmed, with one dissent. DeBoard v. B.
Perini & Sons, 87 S.E.2d 462 (W. Va. 1955).
When a foreign corporation undertakes to do business in West
Virginia, it is required to comply with certain regulations. Among
them is the automatic appointment of the state auditor as its
attorney in fact, giving him the authority "to accept service of
notice and process on behalf of" every such corporation. W. VA.
CODE c. 31, art. 1, § 71 (Michie 1955). When the foreign corpora-
tion leaves the state, it must procure a withdrawal certificate, but
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this certificate does not end the powers of the auditor to accept
service of process for the corporation. As long as the corporation
has any debt or obligation due from it to the state or to any resident
thereof, the auditor can accept service. W. VA. CODE c. .1, art. 1,
§ 84 (Michie 1955). This authority of the auditor is a power
coupled with an interest, and, therefore, irrevocable as long as an
interest in the subject of the power continues. The corporation, by
withdrawing from the state, cannot escape liability for acts done
during the period when the corporation was doing business in the
state. Hunter v. Mutual-Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U.S. 578 (1910);
Frazier v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 101 W. Va 827, 132 S.E. 728
(1926); Moore v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 129 N.C. 31,
89 S.E. 637 (1901).
The auditor is definitely authorized to accept service of process
for a withdrawn foreign corporation in a contract action where the
contract was entered into before the corporation left the state.
Frazier v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, supra. In that case, the
code provisions under consideration in the instant case were fully
examined, and the court expressed what it believed to be the legis-
lative intent thereof: To provide a citizen of our state a means for
prosecuting a suit against a foreign corporation not owning property
in the state, when the corporation has no permanent agent here,
and where an obligation has been incurred by contract made while
the foreign corporation was actually doing business in the state.
There is no mention of tort liability in the Frazier case. By dicta,
the instant case indicates that the Frazier case might now be ex-
tended to include a tort wherein the cause of action arose before
the defendant corporation left the state. This is indeed progress.
but why did the court stop short of complete protection for the
citizens of West Virginia?
Such statutes as are being considered here have always been to
protect the citizens of the home state, often to the prejudice of the
foreign corporation. It has been considered to be against state
policy to compel a citizen to resort to a foreign state to collect his
due when the cause of action arose in his home state. Mut. Res.
Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U.S. 147 (1903); Billmyer Lumber
Co. v. Merchant's Coal Co., 66 W. Va. 696, 66 S.E. 1073 (1910). In
the instant case, P's only relief would be to transport himself and
his witnesses to Massachusetts, the home of D corporation, or to
some other state where D was authorized to do business. Such an
injustice is obviously undesirable, but perhaps, it is the only prac-
tical solution.
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D was under a duty to use his land in strip mining so as not to
damage P's land. His duty was to confine and restrain debris and
to place debris in such a position that it could not reasonably be
expected to be washed into a stream and on P's land. Oresta v.
Romano Bros., 137 W. Va. 683, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952). D ceased
mining operations in 1950, withdrew from the state in 1951, and the
debris was not washed onto P's land until more than a year later,
in August, 1952. The fact that the cause of action was so long in
accruing must have influenced the court's decision. After all, West
Virginia is interested in getting more foreign businesses to locate
in the state, not drive them away because of the fear that some day in
the dim future after leaving the state, they will be held liable to
defend a suit in an area where they have severed connections.
P. B. H.
INSURANCE-AuTHORrrY OF AGENT TO WAIVE CONDITIONS OF
POLICY.-Action by widow who had been designated as beneficiary
in a life insurance policy. The policy application contained a
clause that if the premium was paid when application was made,
the policy would become effective and protect the applicant when
the company approved the application and that otherwise, no in-
surance would be in force under the application unless and until
a policy had been issued and delivered, and the full first premium
stipulated in the policy was actually paid to, and accepted by, the
company during the life time and insurability of the applicant.
However, the company increased the premium after the physical
examination and in a telephone conversation with the agent, the
applicant agreed to accept the policy with the increased premium
and the agent agreed to deliver the policy the next morning. How-
ever, the applicant died the following morning before the policy was
delivered. Held, affirming judgment for P, that there was a con-
structive unconditional delivery of the policy and that the agent
had authority to waive, and did waive, the premium. Gurley v.
Life 8c Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 182 F. Supp. 289 (M.D.N.C.
1955).
It is axiomatic that the provisions or conditions precedent of
an insurance policy must be either complied with or waived before
a binding contract of insurance is created. The principal case turns
on the performance of two such conditions, existing in a factual
situation worthy of a law professor's ingenuity. They are: first;
the prepayment of the first premium during the life of the insured
and, second; the delivery of the insurance policy, and are basic to
almost every life insurance policy.
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